Australia & Japan in the Region

Volume 7, No 9, September 2019

While US President Donald Trump’s administration remains unpopular after more than two years in office, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s handling of US–Japan relations is highly admired—at least in Japan. Takaya Imai, possibly the most powerful cabinet secretary supporting Abe, reportedly claimed that Abe and Trump refer to each other by their first names and that Abe’s informal talks with his American counterpart have been near-perfect. What is the origin of the Abe–Trump bromance? And how successful is this relationship in winning favourable policies for Japan?

The most important priority of Japanese foreign policy is to maintain good relations with the United States. The United States is both an asset and a threat to Japan: an asset because US forces are indispensable for national defence, and a threat because unilateral pressure on trade relations by America may weaken Japan’s economy. The need to maintain strong ties with Washington became even more urgent with the election of President Trump, as he had openly challenged both the US–Japan alliance and trade relationship in public statements.

Abe’s strategy was to embrace Trump. He visited the president-elect’s office in New York immediately after the election with a gift of a golden Honma golf driver, which was followed by an invitation to Trump’s residence in Mar-a-Lago. The golf-centred bromance led to a series of summit meetings, continuing up until Trump’s state visit to Tokyo in May 2019 and his attendance at the G20 summit in Osaka. There is little question that Abe and Trump are on a first-name basis—a relationship between a US president and a Japanese prime minister that in the past has only been seen between Reagan and Nakasone, and Bush and Koizumi.

The Abe–Trump relationship is supported by a stronger role for the Prime minister’s Office in Japan. Traditionally, key ministries maintained prerogatives in Japan’s policymaking process, leading to a decentralised government with little power left for the prime minister. But Abe established the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs in 2012, casting his influence on the choice of 600 key positions in the government. This move tamed the power of individual ministries, for they had no choice but to give in.

The Abe–Trump relationship is supported by a stronger role for the Prime minister’s Office in Japan.

In foreign policy, the role that was previously played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has now been taken over by the Prime Minister’s Office, leading to what pundits have called kantei gaiko (diplomacy from the Prime Minister’s Office). There have been cases where prime ministers, Nakasone and Koizumi among them, have tried to make key foreign policy decisions, but their efforts were far short of the expanded role of the prime minister in the Abe administration.

However, although Abe enjoys a strong personal tie with Trump, the puzzle is that the bond has not produced US policies that align with Japan’s interests. After Trump assumed office, the United States pulled out of both the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement on climate change—two agreements that Tokyo supported and viewed as top policy priorities.

On trade, the United States imposed new tariffs on steel and aluminium products. On the US–Japan alliance, Trump openly stated that the defence treaty with Japan was unfair and needed to be changed. With tough pressure on trade and hints of geopolitical decoupling, it would be difficult to think of a more unfavourable set of policies directed towards Japan. The irony of the Abe–Trump bromance is that, by embracing Trump, Abe createded an impression that Japan would follow the United States no matter what.

Abe createded an impression that Japan would follow the United States no matter what.

Abe’s approach to Trump can partially be explained by Japan’s geopolitical concerns over the rise of China. Frustrated by the Obama administration’s approach, which failed to stop Chinese advances in the South China Sea, the arrival of Trump seemed to o er a new opportunity for the United States to confront the geopolitical challenge posed by China. The unpredictability of the Trump administration—while a matter of concern for the rest of the world—could work out as an asset for Japan, as it was thought that Beijing might give in to increasing US pressure.

Developments in the first year-and-a-half of the Trump administration moved in this direction. in the context of Trump’s frightening choice of words around North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, China began to support economic sanctions on North Korea, possibly in fear of the consequences of a unilateral US strike on North Korea.

However, different perspectives mean that the United States and Japan bring different priorities to their China policies. For Japan, China is predominantly a geopolitical source of anxiety and a rising military power that challenges the regional balance of power. On the other hand, the united states—or at least Trump—sees China primarily as an economic foe, a ‘currency manipulator’ with a huge trade surplus.

This difference in perspectives has led to US policies that do not match Tokyo’s priorities. Trump reversed his initial aggressive policy toward North Korea and met Kim Jong-un in person, while imposing high tariff rates on a wide range of imported goods from China. Although Tokyo shared US concerns with China’s economic policies, economic engagement with China was also an opportunity for growth in the Japanese economy. There was recognition that trade regulations on China’s exports could lead to a global economic recession. Thit is quite ironic that a tough China policy from the United States is now causing more anxiety than appreciation in Japan.

Foreign policy experts in Japan were aware of the gap in priorities between the United States and Japan and the possible chaos of Trump’s unpredictable behaviour. But here the effect of kantei gaiko kicks in. The voices of the professionals have been silenced by the huge power accumulated in the Prime Minister’s Office, leading to a series of policy failures such as Abe’s visit to Iran, which had a negligible impact on Iran’s aggressive policies. Abe may enjoy good relations with Trump, but any reward that may come from it is yet to be seen.

This article first appeared in the latest edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly ‘Japan’s leadership moment’. This edition is part of the 2019 Japan Update ‘Leadership in a time of uncertainty’, which was held on Wednesday 4th of September.

About the author

Professor Kiichi Fujiwara is Director of the Institute for Future Initiatives at the University of Tokyo.

A graduate of the University of Tokyo, Professor Fujiwara studied as a Fulbright student at Yale University. Professor Fujiwara is a regular commentator on international affairs who writes a monthly column for the Asahi. He also writes a weekly film review for the Mainichi.

Image taken by Bill Hagerty and sourced from Wikimedia Commons.